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This paper re-examines the Pakistan demand as part of a wider ‘federal moment’ in
India,  by  addressing  its  connections  with  the  coterminous  calls  for  Samyukta
Maharashtra  in  the  context  of  the  Cabinet  Mission  of  spring/summer  1946.  It
highlights how the twinned processes of democratisation and provincialisation during
the  interwar  years  informed  these  demands.  Both  Muslim  and  Maratha
representatives looked to locate and secure autonomous political spaces that would
better secure their political representation. Their demands exemplified a shift away
from  a  commensurative  logic  expressed  through  separate  representation  in  the
legislatures, and towards support for majority rule at the provincial level. 
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This  paper  argues  that  the  demands  for  both  Pakistan  and  Samyukta  (‘united’)
Maharashtra  were  the  upshot  of  a  cumulative  shift  away  from a  politics  framed
around separate representation for minority communities in the legislature – whether
separate  electorates  or reserved seats – that  emerged amongst certain  Muslim and
Maratha politicians during the interwar years. It highlights how both Pakistan and
Samyukta  Maharashtra  can  be  conceived  as  demands  for  the  establishment  of
autonomous  territorial  units  within  a  federal  union,  imagined  on  the  basis  of  the
majority demographic status of certain caste, linguistic, and religious communities (or
‘nations’) within particular administrative spaces. The emergence of these demands
was shaped not only by engagement with developing democratic institutions and an
extended  franchise,  but  also  by  the  materialisation  of  the  province  as  a  scale  of
increased  political  significance  in  South  Asia  during  the  late  colonial  period.  In
establishing the shared processes through which these demands emerged, this paper
avoids treating the Pakistan demand as an aberration in an otherwise straightforward
anti-colonial nationalist trajectory towards independence. Simultaneously, it escapes
from  a  rather  straightforward  and  somewhat  teleological  narrative  that  suggests
partition’s inevitability.  In fact, up to the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 1946, one
particular iteration of the Pakistan demand might be considered as an example of a
wider ‘federal moment’, which emerged during constitutional negotiations over the
future status of an independent India, and which shared common antecedents with
other demands for the establishment of autonomous territorial units. After the collapse
of the Cabinet Mission’s three-tiered proposal,  the slide towards the final logic of
partition became increasingly inexorable. But in the interregnum, between the Lahore
Resolution of 1940 and the final decision to partition, another possibility for Pakistan,
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based  around  a  federal  solution  to  the  ‘communal  problem’,  shared  many
commonalities with other demands for regional autonomy that were being articulated
elsewhere within the Indian subcontinent.
In this telling, the idea of Pakistan as a territorial entity was capable of being
incorporated  within  a  loosely  arranged  federal  union  constituted  by  autonomous
federating units. It helped, of course, that the abstract idea of Pakistan was always, in
and of itself, somewhat ambiguous and malleable, capable of being shaped according
to the whims and exigencies of its various proponents. Noting such ambiguity has not
only become something of  a historical  axiom,1 but  has stimulated  a  great  deal  of
historiographical  debate,  particularly  since  the  publication  of  Ayesha  Jalal’s
provocative ‘revisionist’ thesis in 1985. An older scholarship had previously traced
the demand for partition back to the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, through which
it was considered that partition and the creation of a separate nation-state of Pakistan
in August 1947 was the logical culmination of the politics of ‘Muslim separatism’.2
For Jalal, by contrast, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and
Pakistan’s  founding  father,  did  not  necessarily  seek  a  separate  sovereign  Muslim
nation-state,  and might actually have ultimately desired to secure Muslim interests
within  India  in  a  loose,  confederal  arrangement.3 Such  an  arrangement  would  be
based  upon  two  powerful  federations  (one  bringing  together  Muslim  majority
provinces,  one  Hindu  majority  provinces),  and  a  weak  centre  defined  by  a
1 However, this axiom has been more recently contested in the work of Venkat Dhulipala. See
Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late
Colonial North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 7-16.
2 R. J. Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand’,  Modern Asian Studies [henceforth MAS],
17.4  (1983),  529-561;  Stanley  Wolpert,  Jinnah  of  Pakistan (New  York,  NY:  Oxford
University Press, 1984); Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); for a more recent and more partisan account along the
same  lines,  see  Sucheta  Mahajan,  Independence  and  Partition:  The  Erosion  of  Colonial
Power in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2000).
3 Ayesha  Jalal,  The  Sole  Spokesman:  Jinnah,  the  Muslim  League  and  the  Demand  for
Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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commitment  to  parity  between  these  two  federations.  More  recently,  Christophe
Jaffrelot has criticised Jalal’s thesis for ‘suppos[ing] that Jinnah had a well-defined
political  agenda’,  arguing  instead  that  his  thinking  was  confused  by  ‘major
contradictions that resulted in counterproductive decisions’.4 Yet Jaffrelot does not
completely  disregard  Jalal’s  most  provocative  idea,  namely  that  Jinnah  and  other
leading  League  representatives  did  not  initially  nor  necessarily  desire  a  separate
nation-state: ‘Jinnah may have put his quest for parity in his programme as a basis for
negotiation in the hopes simply of obtaining a greater share than what the Muslims
actually represented [i.e. within an Indian Union]’.5
Others  have  argued  that  Jalal’s  interpretation  is  too  heavily  focused  on
political calculations and individual motivations, at the expense of the importance of
cultural and religious ideals.6 Faisal Devji, who has instead endeavoured to focus on
ideas (‘the forms of argumentation and lines of reasoning that both transcend and
survive such intentionality to shape the prose of history’), has made one of the most
eloquent and thoughtful of these critiques.7 In Muslim Zion, which makes explicit the
connections  behind  the  creation  of  both  Israel  and  Pakistan,  Devji  focuses  upon
‘religion [as] the sole basis of Muslim nationality’, at the expense of ‘other forms of
collective belonging, such as blood and soil…’.8 Like Jaffrelot, Devji also goes on to
argue that ever since the emergence of the conception of ‘Hindu majority, Muslim
minority’  in  the  legislative  formulations  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Muslim
representatives had sought ways and means to move beyond this distinction and to
4 Christophe  Jaffrelot,  The  Pakistan Paradox:  Instability  and Resilience (Oxford:  Oxford
University Press, 2015), p. 93.
5 Ibid., p. 94.
6 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (London:
Routledge, 1997), p. 30; Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina.
7 Faisal  Devji,  Muslim  Zion:  Pakistan  as  a  Political  Idea (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard
University Press, 2013), p. 9.
8 Ibid., p. 5.
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promote parity between the two communities.9 However, even if Muslims in Hindu-
majority areas were Pakistan’s strongest supporters, and the idea of Pakistan (whether
manifested as a separate sovereign entity or an autonomous unit within India) was
theoretically imagined to include all of India’s Muslims, beyond the abstract ideal it
ultimately  required  some  basis  in  territorial  and  demographic  reality.  Venkat
Dhulipala has pointed to contemporary maps contained within the growing body of
works  on  Pakistan  during  the  1940s  as  evidence  of  an  increase  in  territoriality.10
Equally, all of the lines on these maps, whether premised on the Muslim League’s
claims to the entirety of Bengal and Punjab11, or on Ambedkar’s idea to partition these
provinces as taken up in the Rajaji  formula12,  were delineated on the basis of the
majority numerical status of Hindu and Muslim communities in particular pockets of
territory,  something  we  might  refer  to  in  shorthand  as  the  ‘territorialisation  of
number’.13 Rather than escaping the growing significance of number as a consequence
of  interwar  democratisation,  contained  within  certain  iterations  of  the  Pakistan
demand was recognition of the significance of number at the provincial (and district)
level.
These elite proposals aligned with at least some of the ideas being articulated
by popular sympathisers with the Pakistan demand. In fact, Jinnah and the League had
garnered support amongst Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces by suggesting that
9 Ibid., p 51.
10 Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina, pp. 5, 22.
11 See, for example, M.A. Jinnah, ‘Message to the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim 
League Conference held at Hubli on the 26th and 27th May, 1940’, in Some Recent Speeches 
and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, ed. by Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 
1942), p. 163.
12 B.R.  Ambedkar,  Pakistan,  or  the  Partition  of  India (Bombay:  Thacker  and Company
Limited, 1946), in Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, ed. by V. Moon (New Delhi:
Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014 [1990]), pp. 513-515.
13 I borrow this phrase from Anupama Rao. See Rao,  The Caste Question: Dalits and the
Politics of Modern India (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), p. 135.
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Pakistan (whether it was to be a federation within a confederal formula or separate
nation-state)  was  to  be  ‘a  loose  structure  in  which  each  province  would  enjoy
considerable  autonomy’.14 In  the  Muslim-minority  United  Provinces,  popular
enthusiasm for the idea of a separate and territorially distinctive Pakistan amongst
Muslims was frequently framed around cultural and theological arguments articulated
by the province’s ulama (Islamic scholars). But whilst Dhulipala therefore argues that
the idea of Pakistan assumed greater ‘clarity, substance and popularity in late-colonial
north India’, ambiguity in popular conceptions between provinces still remained.15 In
fact,  in  Muslim  Bengal  the  idea  of  Pakistan  came  to  mean  something  notably
different. As Neilesh Bose has pointed out in this context, Pakistan could also mean ‘a
struggle for freedom not just for one desh [nation], but for many deshes, many jatis
[castes], as India is a large federation of jatis’.16 In this telling, Pakistan, as an idea or
concept that prioritised a federal solution composed of autonomous units, could be
equally  applicable  to  other  territories  beyond the  northeast  and northwest,  and to
communities beyond the religious.
Indeed, other communities that were equally conscious of the potential threat
of  caste  Hindu  and  north  Indian  majoritarianism  took  up  similar  demands  for
autonomy, evident, for example, in the albeit ephemeral demands for Dalitstan and
Dravidistan.  Such  claims,  also  often  constituted  on  the  basis  of  a  distinct
‘nationhood’, were not necessarily framed as demands for separation from the Indian
union, but were considered viable techniques through which to gain better recognition
within it. Rather than sharing political power in a wider deliberative body in Bombay,
the proponents of Samyukta Mahrashtra were concerned with domination, albeit in a
14 Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, p. 96; see also Jalal, The Sole Spokesman.
15 Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina, p. 18.
16 Neilesh Bose, ‘Purba Pakistan Zindabad: Bengali Visions of Pakistan, 1940-1947’,  MAS,
48.1 (2014), 1-36 (p. 8).
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more  limited  political  arena.  In  this  sense,  their  demands  for  political  autonomy
reflected certain iterations of the Pakistan demand, albeit reframed in the context of
communal demographic equations related to caste and language, rather than religion.
This paper therefore examines how certain understandings of what both Pakistan and
Samyukta Maharashtra entailed up to May 1946 emerged out of a related process, in
which both Muslim and Maratha representatives increasingly equated democracy with
majority rule at the provincial scale during the late colonial period.
The Making of a Muslim Majority
Although,  as  we  have  already  noted,  the  Pakistan  demand  remained  somewhat
ambiguous and vague17, it was frequently interpreted on the basis that Muslims, whilst
forming  a  minority  of  the  total  population,  constituted  a  majority  community  in
certain large and recognisable areas of the subcontinent. In India Divided, published
in 1946,  the prominent  Congressman Rajendra  Prasad recognised as  much,  when,
ruminating on the scheme for ‘Muslim zones’ set out in the Lahore Resolution, he
wrote, 
One idea was that the Muslim zones should be a compact one and should
have as large a proportion of Muslims in  its  population as possible  by
excluding all those areas from it where the Muslims were in a minority, so
that  a  large  Muslim majority  with  a  small  non-Muslim minority  could
manage the affairs of the zone much as the Muslims desired … The other
school was in favour of taking as large a portion of India as was possible
within the Muslim zone, if only a Muslim majority, no matter if it was a
small majority, could be secured.18
17 See, for example, Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, p. 96.
18 Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs Limited, 1947 [1946]), p. 220.
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The League’s attempts to resolve the ‘Hindu-Muslim question’, then, were not only
premised on an abstract demand for self-determination, but also involved the practical
delineation of territory on the basis of communal demographics. Prasad continued to
criticise  the ‘reluctance on the part  of the President of the League to disclose the
scheme in its entirety’,  describing Jinnah’s attempts as tending towards ‘obscurity,
vagueness  and  ambiguity’.19 But  whilst  Jinnah,  primarily  because  of  the  political
posturing he deemed necessary to garner support, may have been reluctant to clarify
aspects of what exactly was meant by Pakistan, he did recognise that the linkages
between community and territory were of critical significance to any iteration of this
demand.  After  1940,  Jinnah  regularly  made  reference  to  the  Muslim-majority
provinces of Bengal, Northwest Frontier, Punjab and Sind to support his claim that
Pakistan was already in existence within India.20 By situating Pakistan as a specific
entity within a particular sub-continental space, Jinnah replicated earlier references to
the  geographical  rootedness  of  a  South  Asian  Muslim  homeland,  whether  in
Muhammad Iqbal’s presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930, or in the 1933
anagram through which Pakistan first came to be named.21
In one sense, the demand for Pakistan marked a radical departure from earlier
League policy, in which Muslims came to be presented as constituting a nation, rather
than a community. In this formulation, claiming the status of the former provided an
opportunity to escape the strictures of the latter, in which a Muslim minority would
otherwise  be  at  the  mercy  of  a  perpetual  Hindu  majority.  Yet,  in  another  sense,
19 Ibid., pp. 213, 220.
20 Jinnah, ‘Message to the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference’.
21 The anagram was the brainchild of Cambridge student Rehmat Ali,  and literally meant
‘land of the pure’. Its geographical rootedness was evident in the meanings behind the letters
that made up the actual anagram: ‘P’ referred to Punjab; ‘A’ to the Afghans (or Pathans of
North West Frontier Province); ‘K’ to Kashmir; ‘S’ to Sindh; and the ‘tan’ to Baluchistan.
Significantly, this only applied to what came to constitute West Pakistan; Bengal was missing
from the equation.
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Pakistan as an idea also reflected older efforts by Muslim politicians to territorialise
number, by which political capital could be made out of the communal demographics
of particular  administrative spaces.  By focusing on these earlier  efforts during the
interwar years, we are better placed to track the synergies between the demands for
Pakistan and Samyukta Maharashtra  in the 1940s,  particularly  with regards to the
creation of communal majority constituencies at the provincial level. And critical to
the emergence of such constituencies was the measured introduction of democratic
forms of governance during the 1920s and 1930s.
Rather than focusing on some of the other significant implications of a gradual
process of democratisation in British India, both contemporaries and historians have
often been quick to apportion responsibility for ‘Muslim separatism’ to the creation of
communal  electorates  from 1909 on.  Writing  in  his  book  The Discovery  of  India
whilst in jail during the Second World War, the prominent Congressman Jawaharlal
Nehru,  who would go on to  be the  first  Prime Minister  of  an independent  India,
described them as ‘encourag[ing] separatist tendencies and prevent[ing] the growth of
national unity … Out of them have grown … the demand for a splitting up of India’.22
More vocal still were many members of the Constituent Assembly of India, a body
tasked  with  establishing  India’s  first  constitution,  which  eventually  came  to  the
majority decision to abolish separate electorates entirely.23 Equally, when historians
have  considered  these  ‘communal’  demands,  Muslim  representatives  are  likewise
most frequently perceived to engage with democratic forms through communalised
strategies of commensuration. By commensuration, borrowing from Anupama Rao’s
reading  of  the  work  of  Ernesto  Laclau,  I  refer  here  to  attempts  within  a  liberal
22 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004 [1946]), p. 389.
23 Rochana Bajpai, Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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democratic order to manufacture equivalence between groups or communities that are
otherwise  dissimilar,  or  incommensurable.24 Such  strategies  are  evident  in  the
demands for separate electorates for India’s Muslims, which came to be perceived as
mechanisms through which to potentially equalise their minority status vis-à-vis the
Hindu majority.  This  was perceived as  particularly  pressing  in  the context  of  the
threats  posed  by  the  gradual  process  of  democratisation  within  provincial  spaces
initiated during the interwar years.
Accordingly,  because  such  commensurative  practices  were  most  often
substantiated  in  opposition  to  a  generalised  Hindu  majority,  it  became  common
amongst both colonial policymakers and Congress nationalists (regardless of whether
they professed supposedly ‘secular’ or ‘Hindu’ persuasions25) to equate the language
of universal rights with a Hindu constituency. Mrinalini Sinha and Eleanor Newbigin,
for  example,  have carefully  demonstrated  the ways in  which emerging notions  of
democratic governance in late colonial India were often conflated with the idea of a
‘natural’ Hindu majority, in which ‘one man, one vote’ perpetuated a system of Hindu
dominance.26 However,  claiming  the  status  of  a  numerical  minority  in  need  of
democratic  equalisation  through  separate  electorates  did  not  exhaust  all  of  the
possible  political  avenues  for  Muslims  during  the  interwar  years.  And  equally,
majoritarian  democratic  models  could  also  be  related  to  other  communities  in
alternative spaces. In this regard, until recently little attention has been paid to the
24 Rao, The Caste Question, pp. 20, 131.
25 It is worth pointing out that this ‘secular’ versus ‘Hindu nationalism’ dichotomy within the
Congress, with the former based on a Nehruvian form of secularism, itself does not stand up
to  concerted  scrutiny.  See,  William  Gould,  ‘Contesting  Secularism  in  Colonial  and
Postcolonial  North India  Between the 1930s and 1950s’,  Contemporary South Asia,  14.4
(2005), pp. 481-494. 
26 Mrinalini  Sinha,  Specters  of  Mother  India:  The  Global  Restructuring  of  an  Empire
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 14; Eleanor Newbigin,  The Hindu Family
and  the  Emergence  of  Modern  India:  Law,  Citizenship  and  Community (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 8-9.
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significant  implications  of  the  British  devolution  of  power  to  the  provinces  after
1919.27
British administrators had long understood Indian society as being primarily
ordered on the basis of distinct caste, linguistic and religious communities, rather than
the individual. As each specific community was understood to adhere to a particular
uniform set of values and behavioural traits,  the complexities of ordinary peoples’
everyday identities were frequently glossed over and ignored.28 During the decades
after the First World War, however, these ideas were now politicised in a completely
novel  manner.  In  a  new  milieu  exemplified  by  a  growing  franchise  and  the
democratisation of representative government, older colonial practices that sought to
count and classify different communities, such as the decennial census and gazetteers,
now became caught  up in  questions  about  electoral  weight  and adequate  political
representation. As a consequence, majority and minority communities within India,
whether  defined  on  the  basis  of  caste,  language,  or  religion,  came  to  be  newly
considered as political constituencies.
Equally significant to these developments were questions about territory and
space.29 Whilst  often  taken as  a  pre-determined  given,  the  process  through which
British  India’s  administrative  boundaries  were  formed  had  important  implications
27 For a similar point, see, David Gilmartin, ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In
Search of a Narrative’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 57.4 (1998), 1068-1095 (p. 1073, fn. 3);
the papers on Indian constitutionalism in a special issue of Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East [henceforth CSSAAME], 36.1 (2016), 42-101, mark an initial
attempt to contribute to greater understandings of this process of provincialisation.
28 Gyanendra  Pandey,  The  Construction  of  Communalism  in  Colonial  North  India (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); Susan Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics in India from
the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001); Lisa Mitchell,  Language, Emotion and Politics in South
India: The Making of a Mother Tongue (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009).
29 Ankush Agrawal and Vikas Kumar, ‘Cartographic Conflicts within a Union: Finding Land
for Nagaland in India’, Political Geography, 61 (2017), 123-147.
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upon whether an individual residing in a certain village or town constituted part of a
majority or minority community in a particular electoral constituency, administrative
district,  or  province,  as  well  as  at  the  all-India  level.  The  interwar  period  also
encouraged the ‘provincialisation’ of Indian politics, in which the provinces of British
India  emerged  as  an  alternative  scale  and  (semi-)  autonomous  spaces  with  some
limited forms of political responsibility. Within this changing political environment,
we  might  see  provincial  boundaries  as  emerging  as  a  new  kind  of  institutional
framework, in which different communities now entered into competition with one
another  over  the  distribution  of  state  patronage  and  resources  and  governmental
representation.30 Rather than just dwelling on the creation of separate electorates for
Muslims across India, then, we might think about the way interwar provincialisation
recast  whole  communities  as  majorities  and  minorities  within  the  provinces,
territorialising number in ways which often departed from the archetype of ‘Hindu
majority,  Muslim minority’  at  the  centre.  As such,  struggles  to  redraw provincial
boundaries  can  be  understood  as  attempts  to  recalibrate  the  advantages  being
conferred upon certain communities at the expense of others.
For our purposes, this context is particularly significant when considering the
debates leading up to the publication of the Nehru Report in August 1928. At this
juncture, Jinnah undertook to give up the aforementioned separate electorates, which
Muslims  had  first  received  under  the  Morley-Minto  Reforms  of  1909.  In  return,
Jinnah and thirty other prominent Muslim politicians made a number of relatively new
30 Louise Tillin,  Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (London: Hurst,
2013), p. 21; cf. John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson, and Anil Seal, eds, Locality, Province and
Nation: Essays on Indian Politics 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973); Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism: Bombay and the Indian
National  Congress  1880-1915 (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1973); David
Washbrook,  The  Emergence  of  Provincial  Politics:  The  Madras  Presidency  1870-1920
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1976]). 
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demands that came to be known as the Delhi Muslim Proposals, three of which are
indicative  of  the  importance  of  ‘provincialisation’,  and  the  way  in  which  these
proposals might be seen as an antecedent to certain iterations of the Pakistan demand.
First, they maintained that the Muslim-majority area of Sind should be separated from
the rest of Bombay Presidency, of which it had been a part since 1847, shortly after its
annexation  by  British  forces.  Second,  they  suggested  that  Baluchistan  and  the
Northwest Frontier, again Muslim-majority areas, should be accorded full provincial
status, rather than being ruled directly by the British from the centre as part of a chief
commissionership.  Finally,  they  recommended  that  a  system  of  proportional
representation on communal lines be introduced in the Muslim-majority provinces of
Bengal and Punjab.31
The Delhi Muslim Proposals suggest that at least some members of the League
were already attempting to escape the strictures of minority status, which they argued
placed them in perpetual subordination to the Hindu majority. Instead, they claimed
the status of a communal majority themselves in the provinces of the northeast and
northwest by the late 1920s. The creation of Sind, Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier
as distinct provinces in their own right would take the number of Muslim-majority
provinces  to  five,  counterbalanced  against  the  seven  Hindu-majority  provinces  of
British  India.  Equally,  proportional  representation  would  perpetuate  Muslim
dominance within the provincial legislatures in Punjab and Bengal. Significantly, the
Proposals also abandoned the principle of ‘weightage’, which had been created by the
British  in  1909  to  acknowledge  the  community’s  political  influence  and  as
compensation  for  their  demographic  status.32 Weightage  had  previously  served  to
31 Mushirul  Hasan,  ‘The  Delhi  Proposals:  A  Study  in  Communal  Politics’,  The  Indian
Economic and Social History Review, 17.4 (1980), 381-396.
32 David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control
1920-1932 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1982]), pp. 144-150.
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particularly  enhance  Muslim  representation  in  the  councils  and  legislatures  of
Muslim-minority provinces. Its proposed abolition, then, was part of a broader shift
towards  acknowledging  the  significance  of  territorial  claims  on the  basis  of  their
majority  status  as  a  means  to  better  secure  Muslim  representation.  Although
ultimately  rejected  by the  authors  of  the  Nehru Report,  who also raised  concerns
about the devolution of power to the provinces, elements of the proposals did find
their way into the new Government of India Act of 1935. Under its instruction, the
new Muslim-majority province of Sind was separated from Bombay Presidency on 1
April 1936, despite protestations from both Hindu nationalist parties and local Sindhi-
speaking Hindus.
The Making of a Maratha Majority
The decision to separate Sind makes it clear that number was being territorialised in
the apparent democratic interests of different religious communities under the new
constitutional arrangements.33 However, the decision to separate Sind was always just
one  illustration  of  a  broader  discussion  about  the  wholesale  reorganisation  of
provincial  administrative  boundaries  both  within  Bombay and  elsewhere  in  India,
which was capable of taking into consideration caste  and linguistic  demographics,
too. This was most palpably evident in the decision to simultaneously bifurcate the
province of Bihar and Orissa on linguistic lines under the 1935 Government of India
Act.34 But it was also apparent in the same period in the demand for the creation of
33 Cf. Appadurai’s work on the synergies between an earlier form of cadastral surveying and 
the developing practice of human enumeration in nineteenth-century colonial India. Arjun 
Appadurai, ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’, in Orientalism and the Postcolonial 
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. by C. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 314-339 (pp. 321-326).
34 New Delhi, National Archives of India [henceforth NAI], Government of India [henceforth
GOI], Reforms Office File 47/33 R, ‘Constitution of Orissa Administrative Committee’, 24
June 1933; Ibid., Reforms Office File 1/36 G (B), ‘Constitution of Orissa Order 1936’.
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Samyukta Karnatak in western India, which would bring together Kannada-speaking
communities residing in the provinces of Bombay and Madras, as well as the princely
states of Hyderabad and Mysore. Proponents of a unitary Kannada-speaking province
had petitioned the British Raj for a new province where Kannada speakers would
constitute the majority of the population since the constitutional negotiations of the
late 1920s. However, they remained unsuccessful in their demands until the wholesale
reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries in southern and western India
under  the  recommendations  of  the  States  Reorganisation  Commission  in  1956.
Throughout this thirty-year period, they engaged with a nascent democracy as a form
of  majoritarian  rule,  in  which  reorganisation  would  be  linked  to  protecting  the
interests of the majority community within the new province. As much was apparent
in a letter  from H.S. Kaujalgi  to  the  Bombay Chronicle anticipating  the Karnatak
Unification Conference in November 1936, during which he argued that, at present,
In Karnatak we have to keep the non-Kannada groups satisfied even at the
sacrifice  of  our  rights  and  principles.  Some  of  them  claim  rights  and
privileges  which they would never dream of conceding to the Kannada
people in their own non-Kannada provinces. This successful tyranny of the
minorities … will have to be extirpated for the good of the province as
well as the whole nation.35
The majority status of Kannada speakers within these districts was here juxtaposed to
the minority status of non-Kannada groups, particularly Marathi and Telugu speakers.
As the letter  to  the  Bombay Chronicle therefore  suggests,  Muslim politicians  and
intellectuals  were  not  the  only  community  who  strived  to  replace  erstwhile
35 ‘The Unification of Karnatak: A Moral Necessity: By H.S. Kaujalgi’,  Bombay Chronicle
(Bombay), 22 October 1936.
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commensurative practices as separate electorates and bureaucratic reservations. Such
practices,  constructed  around  the  separate  political  representation  of  both
demographic minorities and socially disadvantaged groups, were to be superseded in
the  democratic  imagination  of  certain  caste  and linguistic  groups in  southern  and
western India by a majoritarian democratic logic linked to the axiom of ‘one man, one
vote’.  For  those  reimagining  the  provinces,  such  as  the  proponents  of  Samyukta
Karnatak,  the  practical  manifestation  of  universal  suffrage  actually  prefigured  the
political dominance of a Kannada-speaking majority within this new territorial unit.
For these groups, support for a new Kannada-speaking province would mean it was
no longer necessary to draw upon their minority status in a larger, composite Bombay
Province, as they would become a majority in the new province. At the same time, the
redrawing  of  boundaries  would  inevitably  create  new  provincial  minorities,  who
would  face  hostility  from  the  new  majority,  particularly  if  this  new  majority
interpreted democracy at the provincial level as designed to work in their interests, as
the above quote from Kaujalgi suggests.
Unlike  the  demand  for  Samyukta  Karnatak,  the  desire  for  Samyukta
Maharashtra was comparatively sluggish.36 Although Marathi novelists, playwrights
and filmmakers articulated the demand as early as the 1920s, it was not a conspicuous
element  of  political  sloganeering  amongst  Maharashtrian  politicians  until  an
impending independence during the early 1940s. Yet we can trace a similar pattern to
that evident in the demands for Samyukta Karnatak and Muslim majority provinces as
espoused by representatives  of  the  Maratha  caste  of  western  India  over  the  same
period.  Focusing on caste  in  the  context  of  demands  for  linguistic  reorganisation
36 For a more detailed discussion of the emergence of Maratha majoritarianism during the
interwar  period,  see  Oliver  Godsmark,  Citizenship,  Community  and Democracy in  India:
From Bombay to Maharashtra, c. 1930-1960 (London: Routledge, 2018), Chapter Two.
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might seem counterintuitive, yet demands for new provinces in southern and western
India (and more recently in the context of the creation Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and
Jharkhand  in  the  north37)  frequently  came  to  be  premised  on  politicised  caste
identities. In fact, the supposed homogeneity of particular districts in Bombay, and the
later provinces of Gujarat,  Karnataka and Maharashtra that in part emerged out of
them, was not only premised on language, but was also reflected in terms of caste.
Whilst  the Maratha-Kunbi  cluster  made up the majority  caste  community of rural
Maharashtra in central Bombay, the Patidar-Kanbi caste cluster predominated in the
northern Gujarati-speaking districts of Bombay, and the Lingayat caste was the largest
in Kannada-speaking southern districts. In Maharashtra, maybe as an outcome of its
comparative lack of linguistic and religious diversity, conflicts between social groups
were principally  organised on the basis  of  caste,  and in  particular,  to  counter  the
Brahman’s social  and political  dominance.  These criticisms of caste hierarchy and
Brahmanism date back to the bhakti movements of medieval Maharashtra.38 However,
it was under Jotirao Phule (1827-1890), a British educated low caste social reformer,
that  it  came to be related to demographics.  Phule coined the term  bahujan samaj
(‘people in the majority’), a term that not only shaped the shifting politics of non-
Brahmanism in late colonial Maharashtra but also highlighted ‘the overrepresentation
of the Brahmin minority in educational and bureaucratic contexts’.39 Phule preferred
this term to the more ambiguous ‘Maratha’, which could be understood to refer to: all
Marathi  speakers;  all  Marathi-speaking  non-Brahmans;  Kshatriya  families  with
37 Louise Tillin, ‘Caste, Territory and Federalism’, Seminar, 633 (2012).
38 Anne  Feldhaus,  The  Religious  System  of  the  Mahanabhuva  Sect:  The  Mahanabhuva
Sutrapatha (New Delhi: Romesh Jain, 1983), pp. 57-68.
39 Rao, The Caste Question, p. 13; see also Rosalind O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology:
Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth-Century Western India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Gail Omvedt, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial 
Society: The Non-Brahman Movement in Western India, 1873 to 1930 (Bombay: Scientific 
Socialist Education Trust, 1976).
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‘princely  blood’;  or  an  amorphous  agricultural  caste  cluster  incorporating  the
Marathas and Kunbis. As a member of the low-caste Mali  (gardener)  community,
Phule  was  concerned  about  latent  schisms  within  the  non-Brahman  movement
between  other  lower  castes  and  the  Maratha-Kunbis  if  the  term  ‘Maratha’  was
employed.
After  Phule’s  death,  Shahu  II,  the  Maharaja  of  Kolhapur  (r.  1894-1922),
became the preeminent  leader  of the non-Brahman movement.  Shahu showed less
concern about employing such terminology, and by the start of the interwar era, was
protesting  the  decision  not  to  award  separate  representation  to  his  Maratha  caste
fellows in British India under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. In a note to
the Government of India in April 1920, he drew upon evidence of Maratha military
participation  in  the Great  War to complain,  ‘We have fought  for our Empire  and
Emperor  even  better  than  the  Sikhs  and  the  Mahomedans  … Still  the  Sikhs  and
Mohamedans  are  given  separate  electorates  which  are  denied  to  the  Mahrattas’.40
Shahu and other Maratha representatives, particularly as they coalesced around elite
interests in a new Non-Brahman Party, believed separate representation was necessary
to counter the dominance of Brahmans within the legislature and bureaucracy within
Bombay.
During  the  nineteenth  century,  Brahman  ascendancy  had  existed  behind  a
smokescreen of British liberalism – seemingly providing equal access to education,
whilst  widening  opportunities  for  administrative  and  political  power  amongst
previously marginalised social  groups, in reality British rule had created prospects
primarily  for those who could already read and write.  The Bombay Government’s
40 NAI, GOI, Reforms Office File 130-148(b), ‘Private. Note by His Highness the Maharaja
of Kolhapur on the necessity of separate Communal Electorates for the Mahrattas, etc., for
electing members to the new Councils under the Reforms Scheme’, n.d.
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implicit stress on a Brahmanic Hinduism, coupled with ‘[t]he old association of the
higher castes with the skills of literacy[,] gave them a much greater flexibility and
readiness  to  exploit  these  new possibilities  than  was possessed of  any of  western
India’s agricultural or urban lower castes’.41 In 1884, for example, out of 109 students
in  the  Deccan  College  at  Poona,  107  were  Brahmans,  despite  the  fact  that  they
constituted  only  four  per  cent  of  the  population  in  the  region.42 Similar  statistics
reflected the composition of the provincial administrative services. In 1887 the Public
Services Commission found that 41.25 per cent of the deputy collectors, 75.5 per cent
of  the  mamlatdars  (administrative  heads  of  sub-districts)  and  70  out  of  104
subordinate  judges  were  Brahmans  in  the  Bombay Presidency.43 However,  by the
early twentieth century, the prominence of Brahmans within Bombay’s administrative
and educative apparatus had declined dramatically.
Despite  the  ascendancy  of  Brahmans  within  nineteenth-century  colonial
Bombay, liberal forms and democratic language had encouraged the questioning of
the continuation of such dominance amongst non-Brahman community leaders. We
can place Shahu’s petition to the Government of India in this context. His petition
failed  to  spark  a  shift  in  the  official  mind-set  regarding  separate  electorates  for
Marathas. But it did lead to those responsible for the 1919 reforms creating seven
reserved  seats  for  a  novel  category  of  ‘Marathas  and  Allied  Castes’  within  the
‘General’  (i.e.  Hindu)  electorate  in  the  Bombay  provincial  legislature.  The
reservations  were  justified  not  only  as  a  consequence  of  the  historic
underrepresentation of Marathas at the hands of the Brahmans, but significantly, also
41 O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 7.
42 Ravinder Kumar, Western India in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in the Social History of
Maharashtra (London: Routledge and Kenan Paul, 1968), p. 283.
43 Quoted in Ian Copland,  ‘The Maharaja of Kolhapur and the Non-Brahmin Movement,
1902-1910’, Modern Asian Studies, 7.2 (1973), 209-225 (p. 214).
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on the basis of their ‘numbers and importance’.44 During the 1920s, then, Marathas
rapidly replaced Brahmans within district  local  boards,  and increasingly employed
these positions of authority to exert influence over civil service appointments, both
within the bureaucracy and in education.45 In February 1925, the Collector of Satara
revealed  that  elections  to  the  local  board  in  Khanapur  taluka  (sub-district)  had
resulted ‘in a complete victory for the non-Brahmans who secured all the seats. Elated
by their success they were carried beyond the bounds of discretion and commenced a
campaign  of  abuse  against  the  Brahmins,  especially  against  the  local  officials’.46
When some Brahman officers reacted to the insults, the Collector felt compelled to
relocate the wayward administrators. The growing political clout of this community
was not necessarily always a direct consequence of these rather limited reservations,
but  was  instead  frequently  linked  to  the  emergence  of  a  Maratha  demographic
majority in the context of their gradual enfranchisement since the 1919 reforms. It
was in this context that the continuation of reserved seats for the Marathas and ‘Allied
Castes’ was contemplated and considered by Maratha representatives ahead of the
next round of constitution making in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Interestingly,  leading  Maratha  politicians  expressed  ambivalence  when
consulted about the continuation of reserved seats. This paralleled the aforementioned
willingness of Jinnah and some other members  of the League to give up separate
electorates  in  the  context  of  the  Delhi  Muslim  Proposals.  For  example,  Maratha
44 The  Reforms  Committee  (Franchise),  Evidence  taken  before  the  Reforms  Committee
(Franchise),  Volume  II:  Bengal,  Madras,  Bombay (Calcutta:  Superintendent  Government
Printing, 1919), p. 683; see also, NAI, GOI, Reforms Office File 130-148(b), ‘Demi-official
letter  from  the  Hon’ble  Mr.  C.N.  Seddon,  Reforms  Commissioner,  Bombay,  to  S.P.
O’Donnell,  Esq.,  C.I.E.,  Secretary  to  the  GOI,  Reforms  Department’,  23  March  1920;
Mumbai, Maharashtra State Archives [henceforth MSA], Government of Bombay [henceforth
GOB], Reforms Office File 42 I, ‘Sir John Heaton’s Award’, 28 April 1920.
45 MSA, GOB, Home (Special) Department File 363(5), ‘Letter from Commissioner, Central
Division, to Secretary to Government, Home Department’, 28 December 1927.
46 Ibid., File 363(3), ‘Letter from the Collector of Satara to the Secretary to the Government,
Home Department’, “Special Report on Affairs at Vita”, 5 September 1925.
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representatives  at  the  Bombay  Provincial  Non-Brahman Conference  in  May 1931
were prepared to support a resolution which read, ‘The Marathas have sufficiently
organised themselves and being larger in number as a group than any individual caste
of the Allied Castes group, do not require any more this protection, nor do they ask
for  it  for  the  future’.47 As  the  resolution  suggests,  many  Marathas  had  come  to
recognise  that  democratisation  could  be  considered  a  portent  for  a  form  of
majoritarianism within  Marathi-speaking  districts  and electoral  wards,  where  their
sheer numbers made it most likely that Maratha representatives would be hired or
elected. As a result, commensurative practices to equalise their status based upon their
apparent ‘backwardness’ in comparison with the Brahman were increasingly deemed
unnecessary.  Rather,  the  Marathas  could  rely  upon  their  demographic  weight  to
secure power in the district. From this position, it was but a small step to demanding
provincial reorganisation on linguistic lines, in which these forms of more localised
Maratha majoritarianism could be extrapolated out and territorialised at the provincial
level.
A Federal Moment?
It was the changed circumstances of the 1940s that brought many Maratha politicians
towards  advocating  provincial  reorganisation.  Much  like  the  idea  of  Pakistan,
demands for reorganisation in western India were considered by their proponents as
now all the more pressing, particularly in the period after the Cripps Mission of 1942,
which had committed Britain to the realisation of full self-government for India after
the  war.  In  the  context  of  an  impending  independence,  it  was  believed  that
autonomous administrative spheres for different  communities  would best represent
47 Ibid., Reforms Office File 46/I, ‘Resolutions of Fourth Session of the Bombay Provincial
Non-Brahman Conference held at Shahabai (Kolaba District), 2 May 1931.
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the true meaning of political freedom. It was in this context that Maratha politicians
who had carved out political  opportunities for themselves at the district  level now
looked to exert greater influence over new provincial spaces.48 In December 1945, for
example, we find the Maratha politician D.A. Surve contacting Lord Scarborough, the
former Governor of Bombay Province, on the following pretext:
I  am venturing  to  seek  your  help  towards  advancing  the  claim  of  the
Marathas and the Marathi Speaking peoples for the creation of a Province
for the people speaking the Marathi language … It would be a political
tragedy if the Marathas … are thrown to the wolves as it were and reduced
to the position of serfdom for all time … I feel that the Marathas have a
right to claim Your Lordship’s moral and political support to help them
attain a political position in the map of future India.49
By this date, then, the demand for separate electorates for the Marathas articulated by
the Maharaja of Kolhapur a quarter of a century earlier had been abandoned, to be
replaced by the new demand for an autonomous Marathi-speaking province. As well
as  marking  the  shift  from  commensurative  to  majoritarian  democratic  logic,  the
demand for reorganisation was framed on the basis that not only Marathas, but also
Marathi speakers, made up a majority of the inhabitants within this particular part of
western India. References to linguistic demographics reflected a relative thawing of
relations  between  Maharashtrian  Brahmans  and  non-Brahmans  during  the  1930s,
which meant that the Samyukta Maharashtra movement was capable of encompassing
48 For more on the ways in which the proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra articulated their
demands  for  provincial  reorganization,  see  Godsmark,  Citizenship,  Community  and
Democracy, Chapter Three.
49 London, British Library [henceforth BL], India Office Library [henceforth IOL], Lumley
Collection, MSS.Eur.F.253/42, ‘Letter from Rao Bahadur D.A. Surve to Lord Scarborough’,
21 December 1945.
22
both groups. This détente was a consequence of a number of factors, including a shift
within the provincial  Congress away from principally  representing the interests  of
urban Maharashtrian Brahmans, as well as attempts to position the party at an all-
India  level  as  a  more  representative  and accountable  organisation  under  Gandhi’s
leadership,  capable  of epitomising  manifestations  of regional  sentiment.50 As non-
Brahmans (and particularly Marathas) increasingly joined the provincial Congress in
this more relaxed and popular climate, a degree of consensus between Brahmans and
Marathas over their regional identity emerged. This crystallised around the idea of the
‘Marathi  manus’  (Marathi  man),  as  ‘the  modern  incarnation  of  the  historical
Maratha’, a designation capable of encompassing both Maharashtrian Brahmans and
non-Brahmans.51
One  such  Maharashtrian  Brahman  who  became  one  of  the  most  vocal
supporters of the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra was the noted Indian economist
Dhananjay Ramchandra Gadgil.  In the summer of 1947, Gadgil  published a  short
book entitled  The Federal  Problem in India.  Contained within this  tract  were his
musings on the proposals of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which had travelled to India
the previous year to discuss and broker an agreement between the Congress and the
League for the transfer of power. By the time the tract was published, the course of
events in India had seemingly rendered Gadgil’s ideas somewhat redundant. Between
writing and publishing The Federal Problem, a decision had ultimately been reached
to create two new separate and sovereign states out of British India, by as soon as
50 For example, the decision to reorganise the Provincial/Pradesh Congress Committees on a
linguistic  basis  at  the  Congress’s  annual  conference  at  Nagpur  in  1920,  under  Gandhi’s
influence. See, Mohandas K. Gandhi, ‘The Congress Constitution’, 3 November 1920, in The
Collected Works  of  Mahatma Gandhi  (Electronic  Book) [henceforth  CWMG],  Volume 21
(New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1999), p. 443.
51 Prachi Deshpande, Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in Western India, 1700-
1960 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 188.
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August 1947. Despite this turn of events, Gadgil still hoped that his discussion of the
Cabinet Mission’s proposals ‘may not be found entirely useless for an understanding
of the continuing problems’.52 Instead, he made reference to some of the other issues
contained within his book, which he still deemed worthy of careful consideration for
India’s future constitutional  arrangements.  ‘The problem of … the composition of
federating units’, Gadgil argued, ‘now take the leading position’.53
Within The Federal Problem, Gadgil had suggested that the existing provinces
of  British  India  had  ‘no  special  relevance  for  the  federating  process’.54 Created
according to the whims and exigencies  of colonial  administrators  during the slow
expansion  and  consolidation  of  British  authority  in  the  late  eighteenth  and  early
nineteenth centuries,  the current provincial  units also skirted around ‘a panoply of
exceptions’  to  direct  British  rule  (princely  states,  excluded and partially  excluded
areas, the territories of other European powers) and ultimately had no direct relevance
to the wider public.55 Gadgil argued that a new constitutional framework proposed by
the Cabinet Mission, based around a federal scheme, provided a perfect opportunity
through  which  to  rethink  the  structure  of  the  provinces,  which  would  come  to
constitute independent India’s federating units. To have any sense of purchase, Gadgil
reasoned, these units needed to be created on the basis ‘… of regions, the peoples of
which are conscious of separate identity, i.e., as distinct from their neighbours and are
conscious of a feeling of unity among themselves’.56 In the context of the Cabinet
52 D.R.  Gadgil,  The  Federal  Problem in  India (Poona:  Gokhale  Institute  of  Politics  and
Economics, 1947), p. vi.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 66.
55 The phrase ‘panoply of exceptions’ is borrowed directly from Peter Robb, ‘The Colonial
State and Constructions of Indian Identity: An Example on the North-East Frontier in the
1880s’, Modern Asian Studies, 31.2 (1997), 245-283.
56 Gadgil, The Federal Problem, p. 67; for an earlier articulation of such arguments about the
significance  of  ‘vague  moods  and  unvocal  feelings’  in  the  context  of  interwar
constitutionalism, see Kerala Putra, The Working of Dyarchy in India, 1919-1928 (Bombay:
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Mission’s  proposals,  Gadgil  adopted  language  and  religion  as  the  criteria  around
which the provinces within a federal India should be reorganised.
The  majority  status  of  Marathi  speakers  within  what  would  become
Maharashtra  also  had  significant  implications  for  Gadgil’s  understanding  of  an
independent  India’s  nascent  democratic  process.  In  another  pamphlet,  entitled
Federating India, published slightly earlier in 1945, Gadgil had intimated that, ‘if, in
the administrative unit constituted, the language of the bulk of the people is not also
the language of all administration’, then democracy would be reduced to ‘a farce’.
Conversely, if linguistic reorganisation were to be incorporated within the framing of
independent India’s new constitution, Gadgil reasoned that this ‘handicap to the bulk
of the people’ would be removed.57 Accordingly, Gadgil believed that reorganisation
provided security for standardised communities (caste, class, religion and other forms
of  difference  amongst  Marathi  speakers  were  here  elided)  in  their  own  semi-
autonomous  territorial  entities,  thereby  privileging  their  particular  claims  and
entitlements  in  a  way that  equated  democratisation  with  a  provincialized  form of
majority  rule.  As  provided  opportunities  for  particular  communalised  forms  of
majoritarian rule, the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra paralleled and overlapped
with a similar understanding amongst some of its supporters of what Pakistan would
entail, with ultimately significant consequences for minority communities residing in
these spaces.
Drawing upon Frederick  Cooper’s  work on decolonisation  in  French West
Africa, we might also see Gadgil’s musings on the Cabinet Mission proposals for an
Taraporevala, 1928), p. 8. Quoted in Stephen Legg, ‘Dyarchy: Democracy, Autocracy, and
the Scalar Sovereignty of Interwar India’, CSSAAME, 36.1 (2016), p. 46.
57 D.R. Gadgil, Federating India (Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1945),
p. 14.
25
undivided India as part of a wider ‘federal moment’ in South Asia at this particular
juncture, which captured the imaginations of European administrative personnel and a
broad cross-section of educated Indian society.58 By referring to this wider federal
moment, I am not drawing a direct link to a longer history of federalism dating back
to deliberations over the 1935 Government of India Act. Instead the focus here is on
the broader ideas stimulated specifically in the context of the Cabinet Mission and its
proposals, not just in relation to the demand for Pakistan, but encompassing ideas for
federation  and  provincial  reorganisation  that  took  account  of  India’s  social
composition beyond the ‘Hindu-Muslim problem’. ‘It must be recognised’, argued Sir
Frederick Burrows, the last British Governor of Bengal, writing in March 1946, ‘…
that  communal  feelings,  Provincial  patriotism  and,  in  their  present  set-up,  the
existence of the [Princely] States make anything but a rather loose federation, with the
main functions of the administration located in the Provinces and States, impossible to
contemplate’.59 Like Gadgil, Burrows went on to argue ‘that there would have to be a
very  considerable  alteration  in  Provincial  boundaries  if  any  such  scheme  were
adopted …’.60 Sir Francis Wylie, Governor of the United Provinces, summed up the
conundrum  succinctly:  ‘The  Indian  problem  is  not  therefore  merely  a  matter  of
finding an accommodation between the Hindus and the Muslims … It involves, on the
contrary, a reconstruction of the administrative fabric of the whole country to enable it
to  support  the  burden  of  independence’.61 Representatives  of  other  Indian
communities were also articulating similarly federal solutions in the context of their
own political interests. Master Tara Singh, leader of the Akali Dal and considered to
58 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French
Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
59 BL. India Office Records [henceforth IOR], L/PJ/10/36, ‘Note by Sir F. Burrows’, undated
[c. March 1946].
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., ‘Note by Sir F. Wylie’, undated [c. March 1946].
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be representative of Sikh interests, for example, argued ‘for [a] united India’ in April
1946, with ‘some form of autonomous Sikh State’.62
Certain iterations of the idea of Pakistan might also be included in this wider
federal moment. Of course, if we accept that the demand for Pakistan was entirely
premised on the idea of partitioning India into two separate and sovereign nation-
states,  we  cannot  suggest  that  the  idea  of  Pakistan  can  be  included  within  this
moment.  Writing in  Harijan in July 1942, for example,  Gandhi had differentiated
between the demand for Pakistan and the demand for Andhra, a linguistic province for
Telugu speakers in southern India:
There can be no comparison between Pakistan and Andhra separation. The
Andhra separation is a redistribution on a linguistic basis. The Andhras do
not claim to be a separate nation having nothing in common with the rest
of India. Pakistan on the other hand is a demand for carving out of India a
portion to be treated as a wholly independent sovereign State. Thus there
seems to be nothing common between the two.63
However, partition was not the only resolution to the Pakistan demand. Writing in his
autobiography, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the leading Muslim representative within
the Congress, claimed authorship of a federal solution to the Pakistan conundrum,
which would ‘be so framed as to ensure complete autonomy to the provinces in as
many subjects as possible’.64 But Azad went further, reflecting that
62 Ibid.,  IOR, L/PJ/5/337,  ‘Meeting between Cabinet  Delegation,  Field Marshall  Viscount
Wavell and Representatives of the Sikh Community’, 5 April 1946.
63 Gandhi, ‘Question Box’, Harijan (Sevagram), 3 July 1942, in CWMG, vol. 83, p. 78. Also
quoted in Gandhi, Linguistic Provinces, ed. by Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan
Press, 1954), p. 8; and Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina, p. 21.
64 Abul  Kalam  Azad,  India  Wins  Freedom:  The  Complete  Version (Hyderabad:  Orient
Longman, 1988 [1959]), p. 147.
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I was also satisfied that even apart  from communal considerations,  this
was the  best  political  solution  for  a  country  like  India.  India is  a  vast
country with a  large population  divided into  more or less  homogenous
units which live in different provinces. It was necessary to assure to the
provinces  the  largest  possible  measure  of  autonomy  even  on  general
considerations of constitutional propriety and practical administration.65
According  to  Azad,  it  was  the  broad  contours  of  his  federal  scheme  that  were
eventually taken up and incorporated within the Cabinet Mission proposals, with the
approval of Gandhi and the Congress. Azad claims only Vallabhbhai Patel objected to
the scheme at the time, as he disliked the fact that ‘certain subjects like currency and
finance’ would not ‘belong to the Central sphere’.66 Equally, Jinnah himself accepted
the Cabinet  Mission proposals  for a three-tiered formula based upon a confederal
solution, and the Muslim League Council voted unanimously in its favour. This other
possibility for Pakistan was part  of a wider federal solution to the thorny issue of
Indian independence that was imagined at this juncture, but which was not ultimately
realised.
Gandhi’s claim that the Andhras (and by association other linguistic groups
demanding provincial reorganisation) did not constitute a ‘separate nation’ was also
contested by some of his contemporaries. We have already briefly noted how Jinnah
and the Muslim League claimed the status of a nation for India’s Muslims, as a means
to overcome their erstwhile position as a communal minority. But supporters of the
demand  for  Samyukta  Maharashtra  were  also  articulating  a  similar  claim  to
nationhood during this same period in the context of the Cabinet Mission’s proposals.
65 Ibid., p. 148.
66 Ibid., pp. 149. See also p. 156.
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Both  claims  to  nationhood  were  not  necessarily  ultimatums  for  independent
sovereignty, but could also be potentially considered as strategies through which to
carve  out  autonomous  spheres  of  influence  within  an  imagined  Indian  union.67 In
Federating India, Gadgil argued that whilst religion formed the basis for the future
territorial demarcation of such autonomous spheres within northern India, the south
‘consists  of  fairly  well  marked  separate  national  groups  who  can  easily  be
distinguished  by  their  common  language’.68 Claiming  the  status  of  a  nation  here
supported the articulation of an emotional attachment and supposedly a priori  claim
to a particular patch of territory within India, rather than displacing a wider sense of
‘Indianness’.69 And  this  was  frequently  organised  in  juxtaposition  to  other
communities residing within that territory or the wider Indian union. To illustrate this
point, we can turn to another (albeit more ambivalent) supporter of the demand for
Samyukta Maharashtra, the Dalit lawyer and politician B.R. Ambedkar, who made the
following contentious comments in the context of his treatise on the Pakistan demand:
Are  the  Musalmans  alone  opposed  to  the  existence  of  a  Central
Government? What about the Hindus? … The Hindu Provinces are by no
means a  happy family.  It  cannot  be pretended that  the Sikhs  have any
tenderness for the Bengalees or the Rajputs or the Madrasis … As to the
Mahratta, who does not recall that the Mahrattas, who set out to destroy
the Muslim Empire in India, became a menace to the rest of the Hindus
67 Arguments over whether this was or was not the case with regards to the Pakistan demand
remain contentious.  For the aforementioned argument about the possibility of the Pakistan
demand being just such a strategy, see Jalal,  The Sole Spokesman. For a range of different
kinds  of  critiques  of  Jalal’s  position,  see  Ahmed,  Jinnah,  Pakistan  and Islamic  Identity;
Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox; and Devji, Muslim Zion.
68 Gadgil, Federating India, p. 13.
69 Cf.  Véronique  Bénéï,  Schooling  Passions:  Nation,  History,  and  Language  in
Contemporary Western India (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 80, 136,
166.
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whom they harassed and kept under their yoke for nearly a century. The
Hindu  Provinces  have  no  common  traditions  and  no  interests  to  bind
them.70
As  one  of  the  most  eminent  theoreticians  on  both  Pakistan  and  Samyukta
Maharashtra,  Ambedkar  saw  both  demands  as  being  premised  around  the
emergence  of  distinct  nationalities.  He also argued that  ‘[t]he use of the term
“Constituent Units” [in the Lahore Resolution] indicates that what is contemplated
[in the Pakistan demand] is a Federation’. And he supported both the claims to
Pakistan  and  Samyukta  Maharashtra  on  the  basis  that  ‘they  [i.e.  Muslims  in
Pakistan and Marathi speakers in Maharashtra] should be allowed the freedom to
grow to their fullest in nationhood’.71 By bringing together the demands in this
way, we are able to gain a more all-encompassing perspective on the Pakistan
demand,  as  one  paradigmatic  example  of  a  variety  of  ideas  about  post-
independence India that were in contemporary circulation in the context of the
Cabinet Mission.
Conclusion
This  paper  has  gone  beyond  simply  highlighting  that  demands  for  Pakistan  and
Samyukta Maharashtra were coeval to reflect on the nature of Muslims and Marathas/
Marathi  speakers  engagement  with democratic  forms in the decades  prior  to  their
creation,  noting  the  importance  of  territory,  number  and  community  to  nascent
democratic equations. The manner in which both shifted away from the politics of
70 Ambedkar, Pakistan, or the Partition of India, pp. 12-13.
71 See Ambedkar,  Pakistan, or the Partition of India, p. 22; Ambedkar,  Maharashtra as a
Linguistic Province: Statement Submitted to the Linguistic Provinces Commission (Bombay:
Thacker and Company Limited, 1948), p. 3; for more on Ambedkar’s approach to Pakistan
and Samyukta  Maharashtra,  see  Oliver  Godsmark,  ‘“Civis  Indianus Sum”?  Ambedkar  on
Democracy  and  Territory  during  Linguistic  Reorganisation  (and  Partition)’,  MAS,  53.6
(forthcoming, 2019).
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commensuration and towards support for majoritarianism within autonomous spaces
during the interwar years is indicative of the related processes that lay behind certain
iterations of the two movements. Both demonstrate how conceptions of majority rule
materialised  alongside the  introduction  of  democratic  institutions  at  the provincial
scale in interwar South Asia. These ideas were not only far removed from the non-
discriminatory, secular democratic practices that were elaborated by Nehru and his
followers at the central level of the Congress in the interwar period, but also diverged
from the emphasis upon separate electorates and reserved seats that had preoccupied
Muslim and Maratha  communal  politics  in  the  first  few decades  of  the  twentieth
century.  That  the ideas  of  certain  thinkers  who supported  the demands were both
firmly  concentrated  upon  the  relationship  between  demography,  territory,  and
provincial autonomy is also indicative of the ways in which certain understandings of
the  Pakistan  demand  might  be  perceived  as  one  part  of  a  broader  move  towards
finding  a  federal  solution  for  India’s  social  pluralism  at  the  moment  of
colonial/postcolonial transition.
In exploring these themes,  this paper has therefore looked to contribute towards a
wider reappraisal of the demand for Pakistan in both a spatial and temporal sense. By
seeing  certain  elements  of  the  call  for  Pakistan  and  the  demand  for  Samyukta
Maharashtra as emerging out of related processes by the 1940s and in the context of
the transition to independence,  this paper has also provided a novel space through
which to analyse the Pakistan demand, providing a shift from the literature that still
too  often  tends  to  treat  it  as  a  standalone  event.  By thinking  about  the  Pakistan
demand  alongside  the  demand  for  Samyukta  Maharashtra  in  the  context  of  the
Cabinet  Mission proposals,  we are able  to  gain a glimpse of the contingency and
complexity of the proposals to rectify the constitutional problem that had emerged at
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this juncture. A broader pattern of demands for regional autonomy and federalism, as
articulated  by  such  Indian  luminaries  as  Azad  and  Gadgil  at  least  temporarily
prevailed, before the events of partition that ultimately led to two separate sovereign
nation-states being created.
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